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EMINENT DomAIN-TmE WITH REFERENCE TO WHICH COMPENSATION
SHOULD BE MADE--- MEASURE OF JUST COMPENSATION-[Federal]-In 1935
Congress authorized the Central Valley Reclamation Project, which had
been anticipated for some years, and in 1936 and following years, appro-
priated money to carry it out. It was apparent that a railway would be
flooded, making necessary a relocation of the right of way. Alternate routes
for such relocation were staked out in 1936. In that same year plaintiffs
purchased a tract of land part of which lay within one of the alternate
routes. They subdivided the land, and a town, called Boomtovn, grew up in
and around the subdivision. On August 26, 1937, Congress passed another
act reauthorizing the project; in December, 1938, the government filed a
complaint in eminent domain and a declaration of taking covering part of
plaintiff's land. The trial court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to the
value of their land as of the date of filing the action in eminent domain,
"excluding therefrom any increment of value accruing after August 26,
1937, due to authorization of the project." On appeal the Circuit Court of
Appeals held that it was error to require the exclusion of value created as a
result of the project after August 26, 1937. On appeal to the Supreme
Court, held, reversed, and judgment of the trial court affirmed. The ex-
clusion of any increment of value arising from the project after August
26, 1937, was proper. United States v. Miller."
The principal case presents two distinct but related issues. The first is
the date as of which the value ought to be ascertained for the purpose of
condemnation. The second is whether any increment of value due to the
project ought to be included in the award. The Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution gives only the vaguest guidance in the determination of these
questions. 2 The requirement of "just compensation" has been defined as the
restoration of everything taken or its equivalent,3 or the value at the time
of taking plus an amount sufficient to produce the full equivalent of that
value paid contemporaneously with the taking.4 The general rule is that
the market value as of the time of taking is to control the amount of the
award. 5 As to this first issue, both parties agreed that the date of the
filing of the complaint was the proper date for computing the value.6
1. (1943) 87 L. Ed. 251, 63 S. Ct. 276.
2. U. S. Const. Amendment 5: "Nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."
3. People v. City of Brooklyn (N. Y. 1850) 9 Barb. 535.
4. Jacobs v. U. S. (1933) 290 U. S. 13, reversing U. S. v. Jacobs (C. C. A.
5, 1933) 63 F. (2d) 326; U. S. v. Klamath and Moadoc Tribes (1938) 304
U. S. 119.
5. L. Vogelstein and Co. v. U. S. (1923) 262 U. S. 337; Carlock v. U. S.
(App. D. C. 1931) 63 F. (2d) 926.
6. U. S. v. Miller (1943) 87 L. Ed. 251, 63 S. Ct. 276. In the absence of
a date expressly set by statute, many rules have been used by the courts.
Thus Charles T. McCormick, in an article entitled The Measure of Compen-
sation in Eminent Domain (1933) 17 Minn. L. Rev. 461, 495-7, lists five
times which have been ruled the correct ones by the courts: 1) the date
of the filing of the petition, 2) the date of the issuance of the summons, 3)
the appearance of the landowner, 4) the date of entry upon or occupation
of the, land, 5) the date of the award or the trial in eminent domain. Sev-
eral courts have used other thnes: time of filing of act of appropriation:
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On the second and more arguable issue, i. e., what elements must be in-
cluded in that value, the court reached back and disallowed any increment
of value resulting from reauthorization of the project. This part of the
decision is put on the general ground, which is widely accepted, that the
government ought not to pay for value which it has itself created.7 The
decision in the instant case is manifestly consistent with that proposition,
and with the earlier dictum in U. S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power
Companys that "one whose property is taken is not entitled to probably ad-
vanced value by reason of the contemplated improvement" nor "additional
value resulting as part of a general scheme of improvement requiring the
taking of the property."9 Nevertheless, there is respectable authority that,
at least, denies the application of this principle to many fact situations. For
example, one writer says: "Whatever the time fixed with reference to which
compensation shall be estimated, the owner is entitled to actual value at
that time, even though it may have been enhanced by reason of the projected
improvement for which it is taken."'I0 This view may be made consistent
Lafayette, M. & B. R. Co. v. Murdock (1879) 68 Ind. 137; time of payment
of money award: Danforth v. U. S. (1939) 308 U. S. 271; Pardeeville Elec-
tric Light Company v. Public Service Commission (1941) 238 Wis. 97, 297
N. W. 394; time of report: In re City of N. Y. (1899) 40 App. Div. 281, 58
N. Y. S. 5& See also City of Ashland v. Queen (1934) 254 Ky. 329, 71 S. W.
(2d) 650, where the court held that value was to be determined as of the
date when it generally became known that a viaduct was to be built.
The general rule seems to be that compensation should be made as of the
date when the state actually acquires legal possession; time of filing of peti-
tion in eminent domain: Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation Dis-
trict v. Fairchild (1942) 126 F. (2d) 302; Interstate Water Power Co. v.
Adkins (1927) 327 Ill. 356, 158 N. E. 685; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Wernwag (1889) 35 Mo. App. 449; time of eminent domain proceedings:
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Randolph Town-Site Co. (1890) 103 Mo.
451, 15 S. W. 437; time of appropriation: Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v.
U. S. (1923) 261 U. S. 299; U. S. v. 813.96 Acres of Land (1942) 45 F.
Supp. 535; Commonwealth v. Stephens (1934) 114 Pa. Sup. 126, 173 Atl.
869; State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Deutschman (1940) 346 Mo.
755, 142 S. W. (2d) 1025. The principal case, of course, is in accord with
the general rule.
7. Nichols v. City of Cleveland (1922) 104 Ohio 19, 135 N. E. 291, 293;
Dorgan v. City of Boston (1866) 94 Mass. 223; Olson v. U. S. (1933) 292
U. S. 246. Accord: Sharp v. U. S. (1903) 191 U. S. 341; U. S. v. Chandler-
Dunbar Water Power Co. (1913) 229 U. S. 53; McGovern v. City of New
York (1913) 229 U. S. 363; U. S. v. First National Bank (1918) 250 Fed.
299. See City of New York v. Sage (1915) 239 U. S. 57.
8. (1913) 229 U. S. 53.
9. U. S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company (1913) 229 U. S.
58.
10. 2 Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d Ed.) 1329. In the curious case of
Danforth v. U. S. (1939) 308 U. S. 271, the Supreme Court itself used
language which, apart from its context, seems to countenance the land-
owner's claim to some value resulting from the project. The court said:
"* * * changes in the value of property may occur by reason of legislation
on the project. * * * Mere enactment of legislation which authorizes con-
demnation cannot be deemed a taking." (308 U. S. at p. 286). The impli-
cations of this statement, however, are greatly weakened by the fact that
in that case the determination of value as of a later date actually reduced
the award. And it may, with some reason, be denied that the Danforth case
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with the Supreme Court's position, if it is limited to cases in which the
landowner's property was not within the scope of the original improvement,
and hence sustained an increase in value due to the project at a time when
there was no prospect of condemnation. The cases seem to support this
position. Thus, in Rowan v. Commonwealth1 a state statute alithorized the
establishment of Valley Forge as a public park. Plaintiff purchased land
and established a resort adjacent to the proposed project, apparently in
the hopes of profiting from the location. When her land was taken by a
subsequent enlargement of the area, she was allowed the value of the im-
provements and the value of the land that may have been due in part to
its location. But the court, in a dictum, said that if her land had been in-
cluded within the boundaries described in the original act, she could not
have been allowed such increments of value.= Likewise in Interstate Water
Co. v. Adkins,'n where defendant's land was not within the scope of the
improvement as originally authorized, defendant was allowed the value as
of the time of taking, though this had been increased by the improvement.1
On the other hand, in U. S. v. Certain Lands in the Town of Narrangan-
sett15 a government breakwater created a wharf site which increased the
value of claimant's adjacent lands. In condemnation proceedings to com-
plete the breakwater it was held that "the value as of the date of the pro-
ceedings does not apply so as to entitle owner to the enhanced value, since
it was sure from the beginning that this land would be condemned."'' 0 Like-
wise in Nichol v. City of Cleveland'7 it was ruled that where the land was
within the confines of the original improvement, no added value because of
the improvement could be allowed.'8
has any bearing on the question. The landowner in that case was claiming
interest from the time of taking and argued that the enactment of the
legislation constituted the taking. A court might well hold that interest
runs only from the day that the landowner actually loses the possession
and use .of his land, although the value for the purpose of condemnation is
to be determined as of some earlier date.
11. (1918) 261 Pa. 88, 104 AtI. 502.
12. Rowan v. Commonwealth (1918) 261 Pa. 88, 104 At. 502.
13. (1927) 317 Ill. 356, 158 N. E. 685.
14. Interstate Water Company v. Adkins (1927) 158 N. E. 685, 327 Ill.
356 (dam that had been built previously and the lake formed by it had made
defendant's land valuable as a summer resort before the land had been taken
as reservoir). See also Guyandot v. Bursdick (1906) 57 W. Va. 417, 50 S. E.
521, 110 Am. St. Rep. 785, in which the court says that an owner must be
entitled to get the increments of value that resulted from the proposed im-
provement and should not be restricted to the time before the improvement
was announced. See also Bauman v. Ross (1896) 167 U. S. 548; Showalter
v. State (1936) 48 Ariz. 523, 63 P. (2d) 189, 191. See dictum to same effect
in Nichols v. City of Cleveland (1922) 104 Ohio St. 19, 136 N. E. 291, 293.
15. (1910) 180 Fed. 260.
16. U. S. v. Certain Towns of Narrangansett (1910) 180 Fed. 260.
17. (1922) 104 Ohio St. 19, 135 N. E. 291. See note 14, supra.
18. The two cases relied on in the principal case are also substantially in
accord: Kerr v. South Park Commissioners (1886) 117 U. S. 379 (lands
inside park lines to be considered as if no park were there and not to be
compared in value to those outlying lands that benefited by not being
taken); Shoemaker v. U. S. (1892) 147 U. S. 282 (any increment due to
park or evidence of increments in lands adjoining not to be considered).
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Thus there seem to be two definite rules for the determination of the
value of condemned land. When it appears certain that the land will be
included in the improvement, no increment is allowed. Where it appears
with reasonable certainty that the land will not be taken, increment will
be allowed. The principal case falls in the middle ground between the two
rules. Whether it would be taken or not depended from the first upon which
of two alternative routes should be chosen, and no one could have known
whether it would or would not be taken. The Supreme Court solved the
dilemma by denying any increment of value where it appears possible that
the land will be taken. E. MA. C.
NEGoTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-FAILURE TO PRESENT CHECK-PAYMENT OF
TAXES BY CHEcK-[Missouri].-On November 4, 1932 the plaintiff gave
defendant, the state Collector of Revenue, as payee, a check in payment of
state and county taxes. About an hour and a half later defendant de-
posited it in the bank which was his regular depository. The drawee bank,
which was in the same town, was open on November 4 and on November 5,
1932, until 3:00 P. M.; but it was closed for liquidation before the begin-
ning of the next business day and before the check was presented for pay-
ment. After the drawee bank closed, the defendant charged back on the tax
records the taxes for which he had given the plaintiff a receipt on November
4, 1932. In October, 1937, the plaintiff paid the taxes to the then Collector
of Revenue, and brought this action to recover the amount of his loss caused
by the alleged negligence of the defendant in failing to present the check
before the drawee bank closed. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the
trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. Held, affirmed. The de-
fendant was not negligent; and the negotiable instruments' rule dicharging
the drawer pro tanto for the payee's delay in presenting a check for pay-
ment does not apply when the check is given in payment of taxes and when
suit is by the drawer instead of by the payee. Beckman v. Kinder.,
In a suit by the payee against the drawer of a check given for a private
debt instead of for taxes, but otherwise involving facts similar to those of
the principal case, the loss due to delay in presentment must be borne by
the payee-plaintiff. 2 The rules governing such a situation are those of the
1. (Mo. 1942) 165 S. W. (2d) 311.
2. "A check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time
after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the
extent of the loss caused by the delay." R. S. Mo. 1939 §3201, Negotiable
Instruments Law, §186. When the bank and the payee are in the same town,
it is generally recognized that a "reasonable time" means before the end of
the next business day after the payee has received the check. St. John v.
Homans (1844) 8 Mo. 382; Wear v. Lee (1885) 87 Mo. 358; Rosenblatt v.
Haberman (1880) 8 Mo. App. 486; Koch v. Sanford Loan & Realty Com-
pany (1926) 220 Mo. App. 396, 286 S. W. 732; Missouri Pacific Railroad,
Company v. H. M. Brown Coal Company (1932) 226 Mo. App. 1038, 48.
S. W. (2d) 86; Farm and Home Savings and Loan Association v. Stubbs
1936) 231 Mo. App. 87, 98 S. W. (2d) 320. Accord: Maxwell v. Dunhax
1927) 222 Mo. App. 193, 297 S. W. 94. Brady, Bank Checks (2d ed. 1926)
135, §87; 8 Am. Jur., Bills and Notes, §670, and cases there cited. The
Missouri courts hold that the custom of banks in doing business through a
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